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    PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY
    JULIAN S. CORBETT



    SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY

    JULIAN S. CORBETT

    London

    1911







    [Illustration: _Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. Schurman)_]





    CONTENTS


    INTRODUCTION

    THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR--ITS USE AND LIMITATIONS

    PART I. THEORY OF WAR

    I. THE THEORY OF WAR
    II. NATURES OF WARS--OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
    III. NATURES OF WARS--LIMITED AND UNLIMITED
    IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES
    V. WARS OF INTERVENTION--LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR
    VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR

    PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR

    I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT--COMMAND OF THE SEA
    II. THEORY OF THE MEANS--THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS
    III. THEORY OF THE METHOD--CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE

    PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR

    I. INTRODUCTORY--
    1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA
    2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
    II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND--
    1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION
    2. BLOCKADE
    III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND--
    1. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING"
    2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS
    IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND--
    1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION
    2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE
    3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF MILITARY EXPEDITIONS

    Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet"

    INDEX




    * * * * *

    INTRODUCTION

    The Theoretical Study of War--Its Use and
    Limitations

    * * * * *

    At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less promising of
    useful result, than to approach the study of war with a theory. There seems
    indeed to be something essentially antagonistic between the habit of mind
    that seeks theoretical guidance and that which makes for the successful
    conduct of war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of
    character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex and
    ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so varied, so
    intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, that
    it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific
    analysis. At the bare idea of a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs
    uneasily to well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as
    leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since the great
    theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted to produce a reasoned
    theory of war, its planning and conduct have acquired a method, a
    precision, and a certainty of grasp which were unknown before. Still less
    will any one deny the value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders
    in war have placed upon the work of the classical strategical writers.

    The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of
    what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power
    of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective
    power of conduct. Its main practical value is that it can assist a capable
    man to acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall
    cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and
    certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. The greatest of the
    theorists himself puts the matter quite frankly. Of theoretical study he
    says, "It should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or
    rather guide him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on the
    field of battle."

    Its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined to its effects
    upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough that a leader should have the
    ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full
    meaning of his decision and be able to express it with certainty in
    well-adjusted action. For this every man concerned must have been trained
    to think in the same plane; the chief's order must awake in every brain the
    same process of thought; his words must have the same meaning for all. If a
    theory of tactics had existed in 1780, and if Captain Carkett had had a
    sound training in such a theory, he could not possibly have misunderstood
    Rodney's signal. As it was, the real intention of the signal was obscure,
    and Rodney's neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed his
    country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. There had been no
    previous theoretical training to supply the omission, and Rodney's fine
    conception was unintelligible to anybody but himself.

    Nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a chief and his
    subordinates that theory is indispensable. It is of still higher value for
    producing a similar solidarity between him and his superiors at the Council
    table at home. How often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised
    operations simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to
    convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan lay? How often,
    moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in the most harmonious
    conference, been unable to decide on a coherent plan of war from inability
    to analyse scientifically the situation they had to face, and to recognise
    the general character of the struggle in which they were about to engage.
    That the true nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as
    clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller light of history is
    seldom to be expected. At close range accidental factors will force
    themselves into undue prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such
    error can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we can
    reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to approach the clearness of
    vision with which posterity will read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a
    question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. That
    depends on the combination of intangible human qualities which we call
    executive ability.

    This, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for theory, but to
    this claim the chief of them at least, after years of active service on the
    Staff, attached the highest importance. "In actual operations," he wrote in
    one of his latest memoranda, "men are guided solely by their judgment, and
    it will hit the mark more or less accurately according as they possess more
    or less genius. This is the way all great generals have acted.... Thus it
    will always be in action, and so far judgment will suffice. But when it is
    a question not of taking action yourself, but of convincing others at the
    Council table, then everything depends on clear conceptions and the
    exposition of the inherent relations of things. So little progress has been
    made in this respect that most deliberations are merely verbal contentions
    which rest on no firm foundation, and end either in every one retaining his
    own opinion, or in a compromise from considerations of mutual respect--a
    middle course of no actual value."[1]

    [1] Clausewitz, _On War_, p. ix. The references are to Colonel Graham's
    translation of the third German edition, but his wording is not always
    followed exactly.

    The writer's experience of such discussions was rich and at first hand.
    Clear conceptions of the ideas and factors involved in a war problem, and a
    definite exposition of the relations between them, were in his eyes the
    remedy for loose and purposeless discussion; and such conceptions and
    expositions are all we mean by the theory or the science of war. It is a
    process by which we co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words
    we use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential factors, and
    fix and expose the fundamental data on which every one is agreed. In this
    way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion; we secure the means
    of arranging the factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them
    with precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without such an
    apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they
    ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and
    isolate it for quiet solution.

    In our own case this view of the value of strategical theory has a special
    significance, and one far wider than its continental enunciators
    contemplated. For a world-wide maritime Empire the successful conduct of
    war will often turn not only on the decisions of the Council chamber at
    home, but on the outcome of conferences in all parts of the world between
    squadronal commanders and the local authorities, both civil and military,
    and even between commanders-in-chief of adjacent stations. In time of war
    or of preparation for war, in which the Empire is concerned, arrangements
    must always be based to an exceptional degree on the mutual relation of
    naval, military, and political considerations. The line of mean efficiency,
    though indicated from home, must be worked out locally, and worked out on
    factors of which no one service is master. Conference is always necessary,
    and for conference to succeed there must be a common vehicle of expression
    and a common plane of thought. It is for this essential preparation that
    theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its practical value
    for all who aspire to the higher responsibilities of the Imperial service.

    So great indeed is the value of abstract strategical study from this point
    of view, that it is necessary to guard ourselves against over-valuation. So
    far from claiming for their so-called science more than the possibilities
    we have indicated, the classical strategists insist again and again on the
    danger of seeking from it what it cannot give. They even repudiate the very
    name of "Science." They prefer the older term "Art." They will permit no
    laws or rules. Such laws, they say, can

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